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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
BACLE D. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

E. ~L ROYLE CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 8028

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATE:NIENT OF FACTS
Respondent ·was employed by appellant as manager
and salesman of a retail radio and television store at
Provo, Utah. The employment commenced on March
1st, 1949, by oral agreement, which was reduced to
writing in September, 1949 (Tr. P3). The employment
ran from March 1st, 1949, to February 28, 1950, inclusive.
(Exhibit A, Tr. P4). Certain terms of the agreement
regarding salary and bonus were subsequently mutually
changed. Under the agreement, as modified, respondent
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received $250.00 per month salary, plus $5.00 for each
television set sold, plus 77o of the gross sales, excluding
warranties and antennaes, over $30,000.00 volume. (Exhibit A, Tr. P5 ). It is undisputed that respondent worked
under this contract for the year March 1st, 1950, to
February ~H, 1951. (rrr. P5 and 53). It was stipulated
by the parties that, after deducting from what respondent
owed appellant for a television set received by the re~pondent and an adjustment in social security deductions,
appellant \ras indebted to respondent for the contract
year ending February 28, 1951, the sum of $141.72. (Tr.
P45). This amount is paragraph 1·of the .Judgment and
is not an issue on thi~ appeal.
Respondent claimed a new contract was formed on
or about :\lay 15, 1951, retro-active to l\{arch 1st, 1951
for the year .Jiarch 1st, 1951 to February 28, 1952.
(Tr. P39, 40 and Answer to Interrogatory No. 5). Respondent testified that between March 1st, 1951 and
about l\Iay 15, 1951, nothing was said about a change in
the contract under which respondent had been working.
(Tr. P39, 40). During this time respondent accepted his
salary and bonus based on the contract in force the
previous year (Tr. P30). Appellant denied there was a
new contract between the parties, and stated the old
contract continued, while negotiations were proceeding
to\rard the formation of a new contract. (Tr. P5, 30,
32, 55, 56 and 67 and Exhibit J).
From March 1st, 1951, to July 13, 1951, at which
time respondent voluntarily left the employ of the appellant (Tr. P27, 46) appellant paid and respondent
accepted without protest, question or objection, com-
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3
pensation on the smne terms and amount as during the
previous year. (Tr. P30, 36). Respondent sued appellant
on an express contract only. (Complaint, Schedule A of
Complaint, Interrogatories and Answer to Interrogatories.)
The trial court found the respondent failed to prove
the allegations of his Complaint, i.e. an express contract
as alleged in the Complaint and fully set out in Answer to
Interrogatory No. 5 (Findings of Fact No. 4 and 5 and
:Memorandum Decision). The Court found that the
previous contract had expired March 1, 1951 (Finding
of Fact No. 5 and :Memorandum Decision). That respondent should recover on quantum meruit (Memorandum Decision) and that $5,000.00 per annum was a reasonable yearly con1pensation, that $1,837.18 was a reasonable compensation for respondent's services from March
1st, 1951 to July 13, 1951. (Findings of Fact No. 6 and
:Memorandum Decision).
INTRODUCTION. TO ARGUMENT
In considering this case, it is to be borne in mind
that respondent voluntarily left the employ of the appellant on July 13, 1951. There was no discharge of the
respondent by the appellant, hence the questions which
arise as a result of an unlawful discharge, such as the
prevention of the completion of the contract, unjust
enrichment and restitution are not involved. Doctrines
and cases relating to breach of contract and acceptance
of benefits under part performance of contracts are not
in point. The issue is not one of damages for breach of
contract or the measure of unjust enrichment.
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Express contract, and express contract only, was
pleaded. Trial was had on express contract only. Evi<h·nc·p of express contract only was adduced at the trial.
The n•:-;pondent did not plead, pray for, or prove an
implit•d <·on tract or quantum meruit. The trial Court had
no basit; in law or fact to give judg1nent on implied contrad or quantmu meruit. The folJ("'·inr~ arguments conelu:-;in·ly :-:lw\\' this error.
ARGr~fEXT

POIXT 1.
THE PLEADINGS JOINED ISSUE ON AN EXPRESS
CONTRACT ONLY AND TRIAL WAS HAD ON THAT ISSUE
ONLY. IT WAS ERROR, THEREFORE, FOR THE COURT
TO ENTER FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND JUDGMENT UPON IMPLIED CONTRACT, VIZ.
QUANTUM MERUIT.
POI~T ~0.

2

THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
FINDINGS OF FACT IN THAT NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED FROM VVHICH THE COURT
COULD FIND FOR THE RESPONDENT ON IMPLIED CONTRACT, i. e. QUANTUM MERUIT.

POINT 3.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND JUDGMENT ARE CONTRARY TO LAW, IN THAT THE
EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT RESPONDENT
WAS EMPLOYED UNDER AN EXPRESS CONTRACT AND
COULD NOT THEREFORE RECOVER ON THE BASIS OF
AN IMPLIED CONTRACT.
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POINT NO.1
THE PLEADINGS JOINED ISSUE ON AN EXPRESS
CONTRACT ONLY AND TRIAL WAS HAD ON THAT ISSUE
ONLY. IT WAS ERROR, THEREFORE, FOR THE COURT
TO ENTER FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND JUDGMENT UPON IMPLIED CONTRACT, VIZ. QUANTUM MERUIT.

Respondent's complaint alleged appellant was indebted to the respondent •' according to the account annexed as Exhibit "A." Exhibit ''A" is a statement
showing the basis of respondent's claim, and as to the
matter on appeal reads:
''To salary at the rate of $5,000.00 per year
from ~Iarch 1st, 1951 to July 13, 1951, $1,837 .13. ''
Respondent's reference to salary refers to an express contract. This is true both for the period March 1,
1951 to July 13, 1951 and for the month of February,
1951. Admittedly, the claimed February 1951 salary was
based on express contract. The claims for both periods
are pleaded the same way, i.e. as an express contract.
"The word 'salary' imports a specific contract for a specified sum for a specific period of
time, while 'wages' are compensation for services
by the day or week.'' Blick vs. Mercantile Trust
& Deposit Co., 77 At. 844, 846, 113 Md. 487,
Words and Phrases, Per. Ed., Vol. 38, page 51.
"Salary is a fixed annual or periodic payment for services, depending upon the time and
not upon the amount of service rendered.'' Words
and Phrases, Per. Ed., Vol. 38, Pages 48, 49.
~

To further clarify and limit the issues, appellant submitted interrogatories to respondent. Answering these
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interrogatories, respondent stated the agreement for
February was written (answering Interrogatory No. 3).
In answering Interrogatory No. 4, respondent stated that
the agreement from March 1st through July 13, 1951,
was an oral agreement.
In answering lnterrogatoryNo. 5, respondent set
forth the t(•rms of this alleged oral agreement as follows:
"5. An;-;wering interrogatory No. 5, plaintiff
that the agreement was for plaintiff to work
for as manager and salesman for defendant's retail store at Provo, Utah, for a salary at the rate
of $5,000.00 per annum, commencing March 1, 1951,
said salary payable at $300.00 per month until the
1st day of November, 1951, at which time the balance of $116.66 earned but unpaid for each of all
the previous months, amounting to $932.28 would
be paid; thereafter, the full salary of $416.66 for
each month was to be paid each month."
~tates

At no time was any amendment offered, or made to the

complaint, to raise the issue of quantum meruit.
Rule 15 (b) U. R. C. P. provides inter alia'' ... When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties,
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment
of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause
them to confonn to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party at
any time, even after judgment; but failure so to
amend does not effect the result of the trial of
these issues . . . ''
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This Rule i~ not in point in the present case since
an examination of the evidence both in the Transcript
and as set out in the Brief reveals that no issue not
raised by the pleadings were tried by either express or
implied consent of the parties, or at all.
The respondent ·s testimony at the trial showed his
sole reliance on the issue of an express contract. Typical
of respondent's sole reliance on an express contract, the
following: (Tr. P38, 39, 40).
]I?

If::.

"BY "J[R. HARDING: Direct Examination
Q. Calling your attention to February of 1951,

do you recall having a conversation with Mr.
E. "JL Royle regarding the terms of a proposed contract between you and the corporation for the coming year~
A. I don't recollect it in February.

Q. 'Yhen did you first recall having a conversation with Mr. Royle regarding the terms of
a contract?
A. After I received a letter from him saying he
couldn't pay what was being paid the previous year.

-.

~

Q. And when was that letter dated 1

A. I'm not clear in my mind. That's been quite
a while. (Discussion off the record.)

Q. I show you what has been marked for identification as plaintiff's Exhibit "F," and ask
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you whether or not you have seen that before? (Handing)
A. Yes sir.
(~.

Now does that refresh your recollection as to
when you first learned from :Mr. Royle that
tlwre was to be a change jn your basis of
employment?

A. That's the first that was mentioned, in this
letter, and ~I r. Royle came down, and I told
him that-

Q. \rha t is the date of this letter?
A. r_rhat 's

~fay

11th, 1951.

Q. Now after ~fay 11, 1951, did you have a conversation with ~Ir. Royle respecting the terms
of your employment?
A. Yes . .Jir. Royle was down to, was down a day
or two after that, and I told him at that time
I couldn't accept that. What he had to offer.
And we agreed onQ. Now don't tell what you agreed. What did he
say and "·hat did you say?

A. At the time he said: 'Would you accept
$5,000.00 a year salary and 8% on $60,000.00~'
He said: 'Look like we're going to have a
good business this coming year,' and I went
over it quickly in my mind to see what it
would be, and we'd have to have a lot more
volume than we had the previous year to come
out, and I said I would accept it.
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Q. Xow was there any discussion concerning ho·w
the $5,000.00 was to be paid"?
~\.

Yes, ~lr. Royle, I think he stated a.t that ti1ne
he was under obligations, said, '\Ve 'll pay
you $300.00 drRwing account until'-! think
in ~ ovember. if I remember right. At that
ti1ne he would pay up the full amount of it.
I think it run around 416 and some odd dollars a month. At that time he would pay up
all the $416.00 accumulated each month, then
keep it current from then on.

Q. \Vas any discussion had regarding any other
matters~

A. Not at that time, if I remember.

Q. At any time was any other discussion had
regarding any other matters concerning your
employment from March 1, 1951, to February
29, 1952?
A. X ot to my knowledge.

Q. You had only this one discussion 1
A. Only one discussion.

Q. \Vith :Mr.

Royle~

A. That's right."
(Tr. P4~, 47, 48)

"Q. In your conversation with :Mr. Royle the
latter part of :May, 1951, with respect to a
new contract of employment, was anything
said by either you or Mr. Royle at that time
about putting your agreement in writing~
A. No sir.
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Q. What was vour understanding with reference
to whethe; or not you had made a contract
with the defendant corporation for the year
March 1, 1951, to February 29, 1952, as a
result of your conversation with :.M:r. Royle in
Mayt
MR. SMART: I object to that as calling for
a conclusion of the witness. (Argument)
THE COURT: He may answer.
A. At that time the agreement was reached for
a $5,000.00 salary, with a $300.00 drawing account until November.
THE COURT: Q. Well, now, he asked you( To lir. Harding) What was your question,
Judge?

Q. What was your understanding with reference
to whether or not you had made a contract¥
A. We made a contract.

Q. That was your understanding at that time 1
A. That was my understanding, that a contract

was made at that time.

Q. And that that contract pertained to the year
1951-19521

A. Yes sir.

Q. Related back at that time March 1, 1951:
MR. SMART: I object to that as leading and
suggestive. Leading the witness.
THE COURT: I think it's leading. Be
sustained.
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Q. ""\Yht>n did the contract relate back to!
A.

~larch

the 1st.

Q. ""\Yhat yearf
A. 1951.

Q. Now when did you first learn that there was
any change in the agreement that you had
n1ade with :Mr. Royle 1
~:

A. Along· in June some time. I couldn't give you
the exact date. When his son brought down
the written agreement there, that I refused.

Q. Did that written agreement that was brought
down to you express the agreement that you
had entered into with Mr. Royle 1
A. Part.

Q. vVhat part did it
r:

express~

A. There was nothing at that time said about antennas, there was nothing about a two-week
vacation with pay, which had been policy, and
about paying for extra help.

Q. Now in what particulars did it express your
agreement~

.A. That it would be $5,000.00 a year, with a
$300.00 drawing account to N-ovember, I think
it run around $116.00 a month holdback until
that time, and after that date in November,
after that was all paid up, then he was going
to keep the $416.00 current until the 1st of
March.''
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A reading of respondent'~ testimony reveals no
:->tatement that doesn't relate solely to the question of
nn express contract.

To rai~e the issue of quantu1n meruit the pleader
~hould ''aver performance of the work at defendant's
reque:->t, the time of performance, the character and natun· of tht· 8~rvices, the facts from which a promise to
pay may be implied and the reasonable value of the servieP~." GS Am. J ur. :->:>7. under \York and Labor, Section
;) 7.
\Vhile a eount on an express contract to pay for
~en·iees may be joined with a count on an implied contract to pay therefor, no recovery 1nay be had for the
value of services on the basis of an implied contract
under a compla:int which declares on an express contract
for sen-ices, where there is no pleading or proof of the
reasonable value of the plaintiff's services. 58 Am. Jur.
557, supra.
·'It is a well-established general principle
that one is required to try his case upon the issues
which he makes in his pleadings and is ordinarily
confined to the case as presented by the facts
pleaded upon which issue is joined, and accordingly a party cannot recover on an implied contract where he pleads and relies upon an express
contract." 58 Am. Jur. 536, Under Work and
Labor, Section 33.
Directly in point is Bloom vs. Nathan Vehon Co., 341
Ill. 200, 173 NE 270, 72 ALR 232 (1930).
In that case, plaintiff sued a corporation for salary,
and by the pleadings set up an express oral contact. The
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lower court gave judgment for plaintiff, and on appeal,
the court reversed the judginent, finding the express
contract void as beyond the power of the president of
the corporation to make such a contract. In reply to
plaintiff's argunwnt that he should recover on quantum
meruit the Court said, page 238 of 72 ALR:
''He could not do so under the pleadings in
this case for two reasons: First, this suit is not
based on quantum meruit, and second, there is
no proof in the record as to what the services were
reasonably worth.''
Also see Foster vs. Dwyer, 51 No. Dak. 581, 199 NW
1017, 51 ALR 21; 'vherein the court held that upon pleadings of an account stated, plaintiff could not recover
upon quantum meruit.
Appellant is 1nindful of Rule 54 (C) (1)-U. R. C. P.
which reads :
"Generally, except as to a party against whom
a judgment is entered by default, every final
judgment shall gran.t the relief to which the party
in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if
the party has not demanded such relief in his
pleadings . . . ''
It is our position the Rule does not permit a judgment contrary to the facts pleaded. A judgment must
conform to facts pleaded and issues joined. Every
judgment should be based upon facts pleaded.
In construing the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure,
from which is ours is taken, the Court in Kansas City, St.
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f~ouis and C. R. Company vs Alton R. Co., (7 Cir.) 124
Ft-<l. 2d 780 (cited in Morris vs. Russell in ---------- Utah

-........ , 236, Pac. 2d 451, 455) ~aid at page 783:
"If appellant has stated a cause of action for
any relief, it is immaterial what he designates it
or what he has asked for in his prayer, the Court
will grant him the relief to which he is entitled
under the facts pleaded." (Italics mine)
ln Susi Contracting Company 1/·s. Zera Contracting
Company, (2 Cir.) 146 Fed. 2d 606 (also cited in Morris
vs. Russell, supra), which was an action resulting out of
breach of contract, the Court said, had the pleader relied
on the COJttruct, he lruuld halie been lim,ited to its terms,
but where plaintiff had made a general allegation for the
vahw of work performed, and had waived the breach of
contract, the defendant, who breached the contract, could
not limit him to the contract tern1s. The Court said in
construction contracts plaintiff may waive the breach of
con tract and sue for the value of work on a quantum
meruit count.
In Morris vs. Russell, __________ Utah __________ , 236 Pac. 2d
451, plaintiff pleaded express contract in one count and
quantum meruit for the reasonable Yalue of his services
in another count. At conclusion of plaintiff's case, the
Court on motion struck out the quantum meruit count. ·
At the conclusion of defendant's evidence and after both
parties considered quantum meruit still' in issue, the
Court reinstated the count on quantu1n 1neruit. This
Court held that such was permissible under the Rules.
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An

analy~is

of the ~LotTi~ ease rPYI.:'als the following:

1. The pleading contained a quanhun mPruit count.
,)

Trial

wa~

had on the quantun1 n1eruit count.

3. By Inotion the quantum 1neruit count was r<>instated in the pleading~ after having· been struck
out on nwtion.

-!. Both parties knew this would be an issue at the
trial.
X ot one of the above four distinguishing points are
present in the case at bar.
Rule 8, (C) (:2)-U. C.P.R. permit:s a party to state
as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless
of consistency and whether based on legal or equitable
grounds or on both. This liberality in procedural matters
permits a party to set forth all the causes of action he
cares to make. If plaintiff choose~ to set forth one and
stand on it. and never thereafter amends or offers to
amend his pleadings so a~ to include a new or different
cause of action and trial is had on that cause of action
only, he is bound by his choice. Within the facts pleaded,
the Court may grant the relief to which a party is entitled under Rule 54-(c)-(1), as supported by evidence.
In granting judgment a Court, under thiS- Rule, is not
permitted to go beyond the scope of the pleadings; that
is beyond the facts ·which are pleaded and upon which
issue is joined and tried.
The Rule is stated in Syllabus l in Atwater vs. No.
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,Jmcrican ( 'oal Corp., Dis. Ct., S. D., N. Y. 1940, 36 Fed.
H7r>:

~up.

'' lJ nder the federal ruling providing that
every final judgment shall grant the relief to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled even if the party has not demanded such
rdief in hi:-; pleadings, the relief to which a plaintiff i:-; entitl<·d depends upon the facts pleaded and
not upon theories. Federal Rules of Civil ProePdurt>, Rule 54 (c), 28 USCA following Section

723 (c)."

Cases construing the Federal Rule 54 (c) are annotated and discu:-;sed in Fed. Rules Digest, Vol. 2, pages
2;)7 to 2(iU, under Judgments, Rule 54, (c) 2, and in
Federal Rules Service, Volume 8, pages 822 to 834, cases
1 to 7 inclusive.
The Federal cases construing the Rule seem to fall
into two categories: (l}That under a prayer for general
relief, the Court may grant relief to which a party is
entitled providing issue is properly raised. Michael Del
Palso, Inc. vs. Carozza, 78 U. S. App. D. C. 56, 136 Fed.
2d 280, and (2) That the Court may grant him the relief
to which he is entitled regardless of his prayer if he
is entitled to relief under the facts pleaded. Kansas City,
St. Louis and C. R. Co. vs. Alton R. Co., supra.
In the case at bar the respondent pleaded and adduced evidence on the issue of an express contract only.
Issue was joined thereon. No amendments to the pleadings ·were offered and no evidence introduced to support
i1nplied contract. The respondent in his sworn testimony
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relied upon an express contraet and upon an express contract only. He neither pleaded or proved an implied contract or quantmn 1neruit. On ~nch record the Court, under
the Rules, was limited to making Findings and entering
Judgment upon the issue of an express contract. The
Court having found that the respondent failed to prove
the allegations of his COinplaint, to-wit: an express contract, should have entered jndgn1ent for the appellant.
Respondent having failed to prove the allegations of his
Complaint, it was error for the Court to enter judgment
for the re~pondent, and further error to deny appellant's
"Jiotion to ~\Iter and Vacate the Findings of Fact, Conrlusions of Law, and Judgment and enter new Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in favor of
the appellant.
POINT NO.2

-

THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
FINDINGS OF FACT IN THAT NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED FROM WHICH THE COURT
COULD FIND FOR THE RESPONDENT ON IMPLIED CONTRACT, i.e. QUANTUM MERUIT.

A.
..:\s pointed out in Argument No. 1, respondent sued
upon an express contract only. A reading of the Transcript reveals the entire testimony related to expres~
contract.

Only two matters were in issue, as revealed by the
pleadings and the testimony. First, the unpaid balance
due respondent for the contract year l\Iarch 1st, 1950
to February 28, 1951. Second, did appellant and reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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spondent make a new contract or change the terms of
compensation of the old contract. These were the only
two i:-:Hw:-;. Respondent's testimony, both on direct and
(·ro:-;:o;-<•xamination claimed only the formation of a new
c•tmtract, in l\lay, 1951, allegedly changing the salary
und h11ull;.; t<•rml' of the existing contract. On this issue,
tlw Court found against the respondent.
Among the elements of proof under quantum meruit,
Pven when it is raised by pleadings, is evidence of the
reasonable ,~alue of the services. 58 Am. Jur. 560, Section 62. There is no substantial evidence in the record
of the value of respondent's services during the period
2\larch 1:-;t through July 13, 1951, except that which was
pai.d aud acce pfed.
The only other evidence which could by any stretch
of imagination relate to this question was the qualified
~tatements of the appellant.
On page 19 of the Transcript, in discussing what
respondent had earned during the contract year March
1st, 1950 to February :28, 1951, and which included bonus
faT a full year's service, respondent's attorney asked:

'' Q. You didn't consider that unreasonable, did
you?
A. No, not for that period."
On pag-e 26 of the ~rranscript regarding the proposed new contract calling for a per annum salary of
$5,000.00, counsel asked:'' Q. Now you didn't think that was unreasonable,
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did you to pay hi1n a salary, guaranteed
~alary of $5,000.00 for the year?
A. Xo, under the conditions, of course not.''
~\ppellant wa~ asked by his counsel what he meant by the
last above an::;wer and use of the per annum salary in
the proposed contract. (Tr. P30, 31, 3~)

'' Q. X ow, :Jlr. Royle, Judge Harding read to you
the following statement from Exhibit "H":
'B. D. Tailor shall be paid a monthly drawing account of $300.00 against an annual inconle guarantee of $5,000.00 for the period of
.Jlarch 1st, 1951 to February 29th, 1952.' In
response to his question of whether the figure
of $5,000.00 was used you said 'yes.' What
did you mean by that 1
A. That's,provided he stayed the year.

Q. That's provided he stayed the full year from
March 1, 1951 until February 29, 1952?
A. Surely.

Q. You used the figure of a drawing account of
$300.00. Now that was used for what purpose1
A. That was to offset the man's current expenses. That's what he drew, the $5,000.00 for
the yeB:_r, and, well, that's just a habit among
firms. As a g·eneral thing they have a drawing account up to so much, and then they
don't get paid their full pay until they have
served out the tenure of their employment.
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Q. Now the last paragraph of plaintiff's Exhibit
'' H,'' which waH not read to you, but which
1 will read to you, states: 'Agressive selling
is the essence of this agreement and E. M.
Ruyle Corporation is relieved of responsibility for 11wne!} guarantees as stipulated in
I kis contract unless a determined capable
('ffort is 11Wde to obtain a minimum volume of
$(}o,ooo.oo and under favorable ])lminess conditions to exceed it as far as practicable in
keeping with good business judgment'. W'as
that paragraph put in as a part of the contract that he should stay the full year and
attempt to reach a volurne of $60,000.00 for
the year t (Italics mine)

A. 1 es. Because l was under the pressure of
'raylor's Departrnent Store to increase the
volume. They were dissatisfied with the
volume. They wanted outside salesmen employed, and a very aggressive campaign put
on.
Q. In the operation of that type of a business,
are your sales possibilities and your sales
volume heaYier during the fall months of
October, November and December than they
are the spring months of March, April and
.May?

A. Considerably higher, yes, in the fall. During
October, X oven1ber and December.
Q. And because of that, is that the reason you
needed to have the full year's employment~

A. Correct. That's the reason that was held
back until November 1st, when that should
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be paid to hold an employee there
period of time.

1n

that

Q. So that you won't have to be breaking in a
new man right when your business is busiest •t

A. That's correct. A safety provision.''
The Cmwt will observe that the above questions
and ans,:rer:::., i.e. the previous year's salary and bonus
and the $:1,000.00 per annum, were exploration of the
terms of the alleged express contract. The Court will
further obseiTe the appellant's answers related to the
term~ of a proposed contraet, and conditions to be met by
re2pondent. ·~he first based on a full year's services and
an earned bonus for vohnne produced duing that year.
The second hased upon a full year's service with a ''detenniPcd capable effort" to obtain a stated volume of
~ales.

The logical inference frmn the ans·wers is that the
:-;um of $5,000.00, under the proposed contract was to
be paid only ~f the conditions '''ere met. These conditions
were conditions precedent to the obligation to pay. See
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Vol. I, Sec. 269,
270, pages 391 to 393, inclusive. Business-wi~e, this is
particularly cogent when it affirmatively appears the fall
months are the important n1onths in a business of this
type. An employee's services are worth more in the
busy months, the fall and early winter, than in the spring
and summer. Tenure of employment i~ important to the
employer as well as to the employee. The employer needs
to know the employee will be at work during that period
of the year when he is needed most. No evidence was adSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1

ltwPd ol' l'Pa:-;onahle value of services based upon a fourmonth tenure of employment during the slack season,
t'Yc·c·pt that which was paid by appellant and accepted

wi/Jwut protest, objection, or qualification by respondent.
'l'lw above i:-; all the evidence to support the Court's
l•,indiug-:-; of Fad ~ o. 6. \V e submit this evidence is in~ul'l'i<·i<·rtt to support a finding on quantum meruit, part i<·ula rly when tit(' i:-;:-:ue of implied cm~tract was not
l'aised. I~,urthermore, the only ('ompetent evidence of the
n~a:--onahlP value or tlw ~~·tTi('<'s is that which was paid
hy the appellant <·\·Pr~· t\\·(J weeks from March 1, 1951
on, and a1·<·(·pted 1'\'(_•ry two weeks lJy respondent as

payment for hi:-: :--PI'Yi('e:-:.

B.
In an action on implied contract (quantum meruit)
there n1ust be an intent on the part of the master to pay
for the :-:PrYi('P and an intent on the part of the servant to
work for pay.
· ·. . . an ·express contract' is one expressed in
words, 'vhile an 'in1plied contract' is one where
1nutual intent is n1anifested by particular acts
and attendant circumstances. 28 RCL 667 ... "
Gleason vs. Salt Lake City, 94 Utah 1, 74 P 2d
1~:23,

1227.

If one, at the tinw of rendering services for another,
does not intend to make any charge therefor, he cannot
later maintain an action to recover for the same, for the
law cannot imply a promise contrary to the intention of
the parties.
''The rule is that when a party voluntarily
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does an act or render~ service, and there. was no
intention at the tin1e that he should charg·e therefor, or understanding that the other should pay,
he "'ill not be permitted to recover for that which
was originally intended as a gratuity cannot be
subsequently turned into a charge ... '' 54 ALR
548, 550, quoting from Kerr vs. Cusenhary, 60
~Io . .App. 558.
This is the holding of the cases as annotated in
54 .ALR 548.
The rule
515 is:

a~

stated in 58 An1. Jur., Section 7, Page

''A promise to pay for services rendered
without an express contract as to compensation
will not be implied in fact where there are no
circumstances or conduct warranting the inference of such a promise or where the circunlstances or conduct warrant a contrary inference.
Such a promise is not implied where the person
benefitted has said or done nothing from which
such a promise may be inferred, or where, at the
time they were rendered, it was intended, understood, or agreed that no pay·ment should be Inade
for them."
In the case at bar, the respondent, by his testirnony,
testified that nothing was said about changing the contract until ~.[ay 15, 1951. He performed his services with
the intent of receiving pay at the sa1ne rate as existed
during the previous contract year. By his own testimony
he is precluded from recovery on an intphied contract,
since he, by his sworn testimony, did not perform the
services with the intent of charging m.ore:, or being paid
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ur uu an.tJ other basis, than that which e:risted
nJIIf rot'/ Jn·ior to March 1st, 1951.

'JJIUI't',

by

~\ud the other horn of the dilemna upon which

n•:·q>Ondent finds hinu;elf il-' that the appellant testified
that whilP a nt>\\' <'ontraet was being discussed, he con;-;idPred th<> pr<·,·iou~ <·ontract extended and in effect. He
pai<l, and rP~p<mdent accepted without protest, objection
or qualifi<'atiuu, both salary and bonus, according to the
terms of tlH· contract under which the parties had worked
:uni<·<wly tlw pn·,·ious year.
Rt>eo\·ery may be restricted to an amount to be
detennined by the employer, good faith being assumed.
Obiter in ny ooldridge vs. Wareing,---------- Utah----------, 236
Pac. 2d 341, 342.

\rhen work i~ performed m1der an express contract
and at the expiration of the contract, the same service
continues and the employer pays and the employee
accepts without prote~t compensation on the previous
terms, the contract is extended according to the terms of
the previous contract. (See Argument No. 3).
If, at the end of the contract year, the same service is
continued, and pay is made and accepted at the same
rate, and the employee testifies that nothing was said
about changing the contract until more than two months
into the new contract year and the employer testified
that he considered the contract extended during the time
negotiations were going on, there is no ground for quantum meruit suit, sinee no intention on the part of the
employer to pay more, nor an intention on the part of
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the employee to demand more, can, under the circuinstances be iinplied.

w· e submit the rule is that where negotiations for
change in the contract are carried on at the conclusion
of a contract year, during the course of which negotiations, the san1e e1nployment services is required, and pay
for such service is made at the same rate, there is no
basis for a holding on an in1plied contract.
If the employee is to rely on implied contract, he
should e~~pre~sly and unmistakenly notify the employer
that he ·will not continue to work under the old terms.
If, after such notice, the en1ployer continues to accept
<:·mployee's services then the employer would be liable
upon i1nplied contract. This would follow because notice
has been given that the employee will rely on something
other than what has been followed in the past. Absent
~uch notice, however, it should be presumed in law, that
the parties continued on the old basis, subject to an
agreement upon a new contract. Henkel vs. J. J. I-Ienkel
Co., 212 Cal. 288, 298 Pac. 28.

In the case at bar, not only "\Va~.; there no protest of
continuation of service on the contract terms, but more
cogent still, the respondent testified he knew of no
negotiations or suggested changes in the contract until
the n1iddle of _May, 21/2 months into the new contract
year. On what basis could the Court then find an implied
demand on the part of the employee to receive more than
what was paid according to the terms under which the
parties had been working~ On_ what basis could the
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ploypr· to pay more than what he had been required to
pay unupr· the t(•rm:-; of the previous contracU

'' ... J I O\\'t•ver, no eontract implied in fact to make
eompensation for personal services performed for
another arises unless the party furnishing the
~Prvi(·e:-; then (':J:pected or had reason to expect the
payment of compensation by the other party. To
gh·(· riH<> to an implied contract to pay for servit·P~, they mu~t have been rendered by one party
in the (~ x pPetation that the other party would pay
for them, and ha n:• been accepted by the other
party with knowledge of that expectation ... "58
£\m ..Jur .. P :J12, See. 3. (Italics mine)
Gjuric/1 rs. Fieg, 164 Cal. 429, 129 Pac. 464.
J!uuliu rs. Uulu111bet, 22 Cal. 508, ______ Pac. ··----·
JVcscoatf z·s. ~feeker, 63 C. A. 2d 618, 147 P 2d

41.
POINT NO.3
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND JUDGMENT ARE CONTRARY TO LAW, IN THAT THE
EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT RESPONDENT
WAS EMPLOYED UNDER AN EXPRESS CONTRACT AND
COULD NOT THEREFORE RECOVER ON THE BASIS OF
AN IMPLIED CONTRACT .

..:\:-; stated in Argu1nent X o. 1, respondent in this
action relied wholly upon an alleged new agreement,
changing the terms of his compensation fr01n that paid
during the preceding contract year. The Court found
there had been no new agreement between the parties.
In his testimony, respondent expressly stated no
discussion was had about changes in his contract until
about May 15, 1951. (Tr. P39). This- was 2112 months
after a ne"· employment year. On page 40 of the Tran-
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script, respondent testified this was the only discussion
regarding the contract.

"Q. At any time was any other discussion had
regarding any other matters concerning your
employment from March 1st, 1951 to February 29th, 19521
A.

~ ot

to my knowledge.

Q. Yon had only this one di~~__·ussion J
..:\.. Only this one discussion.

Q. \Vith Mr.

Royle~

A. That's right."
The la '" go,rerning extension of contracts by continuation
of services is stated in 35 Am. Jur., Page 460, Section 23
of -:\faster and Servant,as follows:
"S 23 Extension of Contract by Continuation of Services after Contract Period. Where
one, who has been employed by another for a
definite and fixed period continues in the service
of the employer after the expiration of the period
limited by the original employment, it is presumed
in the absence of anything to show a contrary intention that the continued services are to be
rendered for the same period as that fi."'\:ed by
the original agreement. This is true, at any rate,
where the parties intended the original term of
employment to be no longer than one year. While
the presumption in question may be overcmne by
evidence showing that the continuation of· the employment was pursuant to a new agreement, a
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e!lange. of the amount of the employee's compensation w1ll not have this effect.''
St~l'

lln1kel v. J . .1. Henkel Co., 212 Cal. 288, 298,
Pa<·. 28; Holt v. Hart Mill Co., 24 "\Vash. 2d
493, l ()(i Pac. 2d 186; Stewart Dry Goods Co.
lj, Hutchison, 177 Ky. 757, 198 S.W. 17, LRA
1~}} K C 704 Annotation LRA 1918 C 708.

rrhe appellant testified the express contract contintwd up to the time respondent quit.

··Q. (By tlw Court) X ow was there any length of
time to this agreement?
A. No, that functioned until July 13, 1951.''
(Tr. P5) .

. Appellant further testified that he discussed a
''realignment'' of the contract with the respondent, during the spring of 1951. That during this time the previon~ eontrart terms continued and that the parties
operated under it. (Tr. P15, 16, 18, 30, 32).
In addition to the rule of continuing a contract by
continuation of servil'es, the appellant in response to
questions hy the Court and counsel specifically stated the
terms of the contract under which the respondent had
been working were continued during these negotiations,
and appellant paid the salary and bonus during this
period of time. The salary and bonus for sales of television sets were accepted, without protest, question or
qualification, by the respondent. The respondent did not
deny that he worked from March 1 to May 15, 1951, on
the previous contract terms. Indeed, since he testified a
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chang-e of terms was never discussed prior to about
.May 15, 1951, he could not have denied that he worked
~larch, .April and the first half of 1\Iay, 1951, except
on the same terms which were in effect during the previous contract. James vs. Pa.ramm11nt Famous Lasky
Corp., 38 Cal. App. 585, 33 P 2d 63.
\Ye submit, the Court, having found the parties did
not make a new contract as contended by respondent,
erred in not finding plaintiff employed on the terms he
was employed under during the previous contract year.
Hen.kel vs. J. J Henkel Co., supra.
Had respondent continued to work for the remainder
of the contract year, he could have demanded and recPived the bonus based on volume of sales for the year
under the rule of extension of contract. (Cases supra).

--

Since an express contract and an implied contract
on the same subject and between the same parties cannot
eixst at the same time, the Court erred in finding an
implied contract on these facts.

Verdi vs. Helper State Bank, 57 Utah 502, 196 P 225,
15 ALR 641, 647.
" ... The complaint was predicated upon an express contract to pay interest, and not upon an
implied one. It is axiomatice that where an express contract exists one may not be implied. 2
Elliott Contr. Sec. 1360; 9 Cyc 242. Ordinarily,
therefore, where the plaintiff seeks to recover
upon an express contract, he cannot rely upon an
implied one . . . ''
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12 Ant. Jur. P. 505, Sec. 7.

Art Wire Stamping Co., vs. Johnson, et al, 141 N.J.
E. 101, 56 At. 2d 11.
CONCLUSION
In Argument No. 1, appellant has shown the pleadings joined issue on an express contract only, and the
issue of implied contract was never raised. In Argument
No. 2, appellant has shown the evidence adduced at the
trial related to the issue of an express contract only and
there is no evidence to support a finding or judgment
upon an implied contract. In Argument No. 3, appellant
has shown the evidence conclusively establishes the continuation of an express contract.
I respectfully subinit the District Court's ruling
should be reversed and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Judgrn.ent should be entered in favor of the
appellant.

HERBERT F. SMART
Attorney for Appellant
1122 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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